post-quantum-cryptography
14 posts tagged post-quantum-cryptography.
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How the NIST Finalists Broke: Rainbow in a Weekend, SIKE in an Afternoon, and the Graveyard of Post-Quantum Candidates
In 2022 two vetted NIST post-quantum candidates fell to classical math -- Rainbow in a weekend, SIKE in ten minutes. That is the process working, not failing.
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How the Whole Stack Would Break: SIDH, Correlated Assumptions, and the Cryptography We Are Betting the Next Thirty Years On
No post-quantum algorithm is proven hard. The stack's only real defense is a deliberately uncorrelated portfolio of lattice, code, and hash assumptions.
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How Falcon Would Break: NTRU Lattices and the Structure Nobody Fully Trusts
Falcon is NIST's smallest post-quantum signature and its only lattice one still in draft. A structural case for why its likeliest break is NTRU-specific.
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How ML-KEM Breaks in Real Life: The Machine Leaked While the Math Held
ML-KEM shipped with a machine-checked security proof, yet its reference code leaked secret keys through a division instruction. Why every break missed the math.
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How Q-Day Breaks Everything: Shor's Algorithm and the Simultaneous Fall of RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSA, and elliptic curves share one abelian period. A single quantum computer running Shor's algorithm reads it and breaks all four at once.
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How SLH-DSA Would Break: The Signature That Can Only Fall If a Hash Falls First
SLH-DSA has almost no attack surface of its own. A structural tour of FORS, WOTS+ hypertrees and tweakable hashes, and why it fails only if SHA-2 or SHAKE does.
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Q-Day Has Not Happened. The Incident Already Has: Harvest Now, Decrypt Later
No quantum computer can break RSA in 2026, yet long-lived secrets encrypted today may already be lost. Harvest now, decrypt later is a deployment failure.
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The Hedge and Its Fault Line: How Classic McEliece and HQC Would Break
Classic McEliece and HQC hedge post-quantum encryption on syndrome decoding, a problem unrelated to lattices -- and here is where their own math gives way.
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Two Standards, One Lattice: How ML-KEM and ML-DSA Would Break
ML-KEM and ML-DSA rest on one hard problem, Module-LWE, measured by one ruler. Here is how that ruler would slip -- and why one slip debits both standards.
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You Cannot Rotate What You Cannot See: Crypto-Agility and the Cryptographic Bill of Materials
The hard part of post-quantum is not the new algorithms -- it is finding the old ones. A field guide to crypto-agility, discovery, and the CycloneDX CBOM.
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One Event, Three Assumptions, Five Answers: A Field Guide to the Post-Quantum Toolkit
A field guide to the five NIST post-quantum primitives -- ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FN-DSA, HQC: math intuition, exact sizes, failures, and decision rules.
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Secure Against Whom? The Security Definitions Every Protocol Designer Needs
A protocol designer's field guide to IND-CPA, IND-CCA2, EUF-CMA, AEAD, and the random oracle model, and why the wrong adversary model sinks real protocols.
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The Thirty-Year Migration Ships in a pip install: How Post-Quantum Cryptography Crossed from Standard to Shipping Code
Post-quantum cryptography spent thirty years reaching a pip install. ML-KEM and ML-DSA shipped in pyca/cryptography v48 weeks ahead of the federal deadline.
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The TPM in Windows: One Primitive, Twenty-Five Years, and the Chip Microsoft Bet On Twice
How a passive 1999 cryptoprocessor became the load-bearing pillar of Windows security, and what twenty-five years of attacks taught us about its limits.